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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the benefits of the policy, complied \vith the wrongful demands. The
result reached by the court might possibly be justified by treating the
threat to cancel the policy as a threat to breach a contract, such a threat
having been held not to constitute duress ;23 however, in order to sustain
this reasoning it must appear that the plaintiff's action on the contract
of insurance would adequately compensate him 24 and that he would
suffer no loss pending the time of the trial of his cause in the event
that he should ultimately lose the case.
At any rate, it seems that the court should have considered the
doctrine of economic compulsion; and there' is little justification for
deciding the case on a rule of law 25 which is at most questionably applicable, since the payment of the premiums can scarcely be considered
voluntary. 26
JOHN TAYLOR SCHILLER.

Insurance-Burial Associations-Definition of Insurance.
Defendant funeral home was enjoined from doing an insurance
business without complying with the insurance laws.1 Thereafter
defendant sold contracts for $50, payable in monthly installments, which
provided that the purchaser would be rendered certain funeral services
on death, and that the purchaser's representative would be entitled
to funeral merchandise at reduced prices. There was a further stipulation that the exercise of the privileges under the contract would render
the unpaid balance due and collectible. Contempt proceedings were
instituted by the Insurance Commissioner. Held: Since no element of
risk was involved the agreements were not insurance contracts and
defendant did not violate the injunction in making sales subsequently
2
thereto.
Statutory definitions of insurance are ordinarily couched in such
general terms as to be of little value. North Carolina has one of the
more widely accepted definitions: "A contract of insurance is an
agreement by which one party for a consideration promises to pay
money or its equivalent or to do some act of value to the insured upon,
and as an indemnity for, the destruction, loss, or injury of something
See note 16 supra.
See note 17 supra.
" ... money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts cannot be recovered back except where it was paid under duress, fraud, or mistake." (Italics
the writer's). Ignatovig v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 16 F. Supp. 764

(M. D. Pa. 1935).

'A settlement of the case was subsequently made. For a recent discussion of
this subject see (1937) 3 U. OF PrrSBuRGH L. Ray. 241.
' South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison, 182 Ga. 60, 184 S. E. 875 (1936).
' South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison, 188 S. E. 529 (Ga. 1936).
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in which the other party has an interest."' The broad generalities of
the definition are obvious.
Though there is a perplexing problem as to what constitutes insurance, all insurance contracts necessarily contain the following elements :4
"(1) One party possesses an interest susceptible of pecuniary estimation". This insurable interest requirement is based on public policy
which condemns as a mere wager any agreement for insurance on anything in which the parties have no interest. "(2) That interest is subject
to some well-defined peril or perils, the happening of which will destroy
or impair it, thereby causing loss to the risk bearer." A contract which
might otherwise be held insurance is likely to be called an executory
sales agreement where there is no element of risk. "(3) There is an
assumption of this risk by the other party to the contract." Insurance
is primarily considered as a risk-shifting device. "(4) The contract
for assuming the risk must be an integral part of a general scheme
for distributing a loss that may be suffered by any individual interest
owner among a considerable group of persons exposed to similar perils.
(5) The insured must make a ratable contribution, called a premium,
to the general insurance fund." 5
However the fact that the above elements are present in a particular
instance is not conclusive. The courts in addition devise and apply
other tests.
One frequest test is control. This is ordinarily applied in regard
to indemnities accompanying sales of goods. If the happening of the
risk is within the control of the vendor, then the courts hold that the
contract is not insurance. Or stated differently, if the warranty includes
hazards other than defects in articles sold, it is insurance. Thus a contract to repair plate glass windows and to replace them if broken from
any cause is an insurance contract because the breakage is beyond the
control of the repairer ;6 a contract to furnish mercantile reports which
guarantees their accuracy is not insurance since the credit company
can control the accuracy of its reports ;7 an organization which pays
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6262. At least 10 other states have almost
the identical statute, including Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington.
Other states have
adopted definitions for particular branches of insurance. For example, GEORGrA
CODE (1933) §56-901, "A life insurance policy is a contract by which the insurer, for

a stipulated sum, engages to pay a certain amount of money if another shall die
within the time limited by the policy. The life may be that of the insured or of
another in the continuance of'whose life the insured has an interest."
'VANCE, INsURA cE (2d ed. 1930) §5.

'The presence of elements 4 and 5 distinguishes an insurance contract from an
ordinary guaranty or warranty.

An ordinary suretyship contains elements 1, 2,

and 3 but is not considered insurance.
'People v. Standard Plite Glass and Salvage Co., 174 App. Div. 501, 156 N. Y.
Supp. 1012 (1916). But cf. Moresh v. O'Regan, 120 N. J. Eq. 534, 187 Atd. 619
(1936) ; People v. Roschli, 291 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1936).
People ex re. Daily Credit Service Corp. v. May, 162 App. Div. 215, 147
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benefits to its members on marriage is not engaged in the insurance
8
business as there is no risk outside the control of its members.
Another test imposed is that of the purpose of the contract. Where
benefits, predicated on the occurrence of an event, are but incidental
to the main purpose of a contract, the transaction is not insurance.
Thus, a contract of a hospital to care for a patient the remainder of her
life for a stated sum is not ultra vires as an insurance agreement ;9 an
indemnity promise accompanying the sale of lightning rods is not
insurance, as the guaranty is incidental to the sale ;10 a contract of a
brewing company guaranteeing the payment of rent by a saloon-keeper
is incidental to the saloon-keeper's contract to sell only the brewing
company's beer;"' also employee relief funds made up from the
employee's wages and administered by the employer are not insurance ;12 nor is an employer's contract to protect employees from violence
13
by strikers an insurance contract.
However many courts do not apply the purpose of the contract test
and construe incidental benefits within the definitions of insurance. A
sale of furniture on the installment plan with a provision that the
balance of the installments due would be cancelled in case of death of
the purchaser before final payment was held to be insurance. 14 Building
and loan associations which contract for extinguishment of a debt in
case of death of the debtor have been held to be dealing in insurance. 1
A promise by a newspaper to pay a sum to the estate of any person
accidentally killed with a copy of such newspaper in his possession was
held an insurance contract and therefore ultra vires of the publishing
company.16
Concerns organized with the purpose of dealing in risks, or conducting a business or offering a line of service founded on risk, are almost
uniformly declared to be insurance companies. Burial associations
N. Y. Supp. 487 (1914), aff'd 212 N. Y. 561, 106 N. E. 1039 (1914).

But cf.

Ops. Att'y Gen. (N. Y. 1921) 235.
8 Chafart v. Payton, 91 Ind. 202 (1883) ; State v. Towle, 80 Me. 287, 14 Atl.
195 (1888); cf. White v. Equitable Nuptial Ben. Union, 76 Ala. 251 (1884);
Garratt v. Baker, 5 Cal. (2d) 745, 43 P. (2d) 828 (1935), rev'd 56 P. (2d) 225

(1936).

'Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis v. Guillaunmes Estate, 222 Ill. App.
543 (1921).
" Cole Bros. and Hart v. Haven, 7 N. W. 383 (Iowa, 1880).
u James Eva Estate v. Mecca Co., 40 Cal. App. 515, 181 Pac. 415 (1919).
" Colaizzi v. Pa. Ry., 208 N. Y. 275, 101 N. E. 859 (1913); State ex. rel.
Sheets v. Pittsburgh, C, C. and St. L. R. R., 68 Ohio St. 9, 67 N. E. 93 (1903).
'Hansen v. Dodwell Dock and Warehouse Co., 100 Wash. 46, 170 Pac. 346

(1918).

' Att'y Gen. v. Osgood Co., 249 Mass. 473, 144 N. E. 371 (1924), (1924) 24
CL. L. REv. 802, (1924) 23 MICH. L. REv. 191.
"United Security Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Bond, 16 D. C. App. 579 (1900);
State v. Beardsley, 88 Minn. 20, 92 N. W. 472 (1902).
18Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 463 (1882).
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which offer burial services for periodic payments are ordinarily subjected to insurance regulations. 17 Various attempts to camouflage the
real nature of the business under the guise of a service organization
have been of no avail. Thus, automobile associations offering contingent accommodation services and legal aid,' 8 title guaranty companies, 9 realty corporations guaranteeing the value of auctioned land,20
a crop insurance company disguising its contracts as sales options,21
and physicians' defense associations, 22 have all been deemed insurance
companies.
A third test is termed the necessity of regulation. Is the company
of such a type that it should be subjected to insurance regulation?
Although this appears to be one of the most satisfactory standards, the
problem has been approached in this manner in only a few instances.
Benevolent associations are not considered insurance companies because
of their philanthropic objects although the usual insurance elements are
present.28 Ordinarily annuity contracts are not considered insurance
because they provide for periodic receipts in consideration of the pay24
Yet
ment of a lump sum to begin at the inception of the contract.
annuity contracts are regulated as insurance in some jurisdictions so
as to assure the company's ability to pay.25 Although an ordinary

" State v. Wichita Mutual Burial Ass'n, 73 Kan. 179, 84 Pac. 757 (1906);
Oklahoma Southwestern Burial Ass'n v. State, 135 Okla. 151, 274 Pac. 642
(1929); State v. Mutual Mortuary Ass'n, 166 Tenn. 260, 61 S. W. (2d) 664
(1933); State ex. rel. Reece v. Stout, 16 Tenn. App. 10, 65 S. W. (2d) 827
(1933) ; cf. State v. Gooch, 165 Tenn. 97, 52 S. W. (2d) 143 (1932) ; N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6476(z); P. L. N. C. 1937, c.239, commented on in this
R-viEw.

"Allin v. Motorist's Alliance of America, 234 Ky. 714, 29 S. W. (2d) 19
(1930) ; State v. Spauldini, 166 Minn. 167, 207 N. W. 317 (1926) ; State v. Bean,
193 Minn. 113, 258 N. W. 18 (1934) ; National Automobile Service Corp. v. State
55 S. W. (2d) 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
"Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 214
Pac. 667 (1923) ; People v. New York Title and Mortgage Co., 346 Ill. 278, 178
N. E. 661 (1931). Accord: Wilson v. Louisville Title Co., 244 Ky. 683, 51 S. W.
(2d) 971 (1932).
1 Commonwealth v. Fidelity Land Value Assurance Co., 312 Pa. 425, 167 AtI.
300 (1933). But cf. People v. Potts, 264 Ill. 522, 106 N. E. 524 (1914). Contra:
Saltzman v. Fairbanks Realty Co., 145 Misc. 478, 260 N. Y. Supp. 334 (1932).
'lin re Hogan, 8 N. D. 301, 78 N. W. 1051 (1899).
'Physicians' Defense Co. v. Cooper, 199 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912);
Physicians' Defense Co. v.-O Brien, 100 Minn. 490, 111 N. W. 396 (1907). Contra:
Vredenburgh v. Physicians' Defense Co., 126 Ill. App. 509 (1906) ; State ex. rel.

Physicians' Defense Co. v. Laylin, 73 Ohio St 90, 76 N. E. 567 (1905).

'Fischer v. American Legion of Honor, 168 Pa. 279, 31 Ati. 1089 (1895);
Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n of Chicago v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99, 26 Atl. 253
(1893) ; Comm. ex. rel. Att'y Gen. v. Equitable Benefit Ass'n, 137 Pa. 412, 18
Atl. 1112 (1890) ; cf. Peterson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 244 Ill. 329, 91 N. E.
466 (1910).
' Rischel v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 78 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A.
10th, 1935); Hall v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 146 Ore. 32, 28 P. (2d) 875
(1934).
'For example, MAss. LAws ANN. (1933) c. 175, §118. Applied in Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 227 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 469 (1917).
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surety is not considered as an insurer, when a company makes a business of suretyship it may be subjected to insurance law to protect the
26
public.
Thus it may be seen that predictability as to whether a company will
be held to be engaging in insurance is a rather complex problem.
Contracts of private 27 undertaking establishments which offer future
burial services and sell funeral merchandise in consideration of installment payments (depending on the longevity of the buyer) present a
fertile field for the insurance tests. Analytically, an application of the
control test would necessitate a finding that the contract is insurance,
since the risk is beyond the control of the undertaker. The necessity of
regulation test would lead to the same result, since the undertaker's
ability to perform should be safeguarded. However, the risk element is
merely incidental to the main purpose of the contract, to promote business. Hence, the purpose of the contract test would lead to an opposite
conclusion. Since most of the contracts fit the broad statutory definitions
of insurance and contain the elements of an insurance agreement, the
private undertaking establishments are usually subjected to insurance
28
regulation.
In the instant case 29 the defendant cleverly evaded insurance regulation by removing from the contract the essential element of a risk. This
was accomplished by the insertion in the agreement of the stipulation
that the exercise of privileges under the contract would render the
unpaid balance due and collectible. The court then construed the contract as an exchange of stated value for value. The fact that the defendant might receive interest on that amount of money paid in, the
size of which amount was dependent upon the longevity of the purchaser, was a contingency which the court apparently failed to consider. Therefore the court was not accurate in holding that there was
no risk involved. Aside from conformity to definitions, small concerns like the defendant are those most needing insurance regulation
to make certain their ability to perform. Hence, the interest of the
public would have been better served if the court had adopted the
01Home Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931),
aff'd, 285 U. S. 191, 52 Sup. Ct. 319, 76 L. ed. 695 (1932); Young v. American
Bonding Co., 228 Pa. 373, 77 Atl. 623 (1910) ; cf. Southern Surety Co. v. Austin,
17 S. W. (2d) 774 (Comm. of Appeals, Tex. 1929).
= Not to be confused with burial associations. See note 17, supra.
State v. Jones Co., 108 Fla. 613, 147 So. 230 (1933) ; Renschler v. State, ea.
rel. Hogan, 90 Ohio St. 363, 107 N. E. 758 (1914); Lukens v. Bair Co., 104 Pa.
280, 158 Atl. 654 (1932) ; Ruto v. Italian Burial Casket Co., 104 Pa. 288, 158 Atl.
657 (1932); Sgro v. Pa. Burial Co., 113 Pa. 20, 171 AtI. 425 (1934); Sisson,
Att'y Gen. ex. rel. Nardolillo v. Prata Undertaking Co., 49 R. I. 132, 141 Atl. 76
(1929) ; State ex. rel. Fishback v. Globe Casket and Undertaking Co., 82 Wash.
124, 143 Pac. 878 (1914).
' South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison, 188 S. E. 529 (Ga. 1936).
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necessity of regulationtest and declared that the defendant was carrying
on a business which should be regulated by insurance laws.
JOHN HUGH WILLIAMS.

Insurance-Defense of Actions--Negligence
Plaintiff, the insured, was sued by X for injuries caused by plaintiff's
negligently driven automobile. Defendant, the plaintiff's insurance company, defended the suit as required by the terms of the policy, and X
recovered a judgment considerably in excess of the amount of the policy.
Plaintiff sought to recover the difference between the amount of the
policy and the judgment recovered against him. He alleged that defendant was negligent in: (1) waiving the defense of contributory negligence, (2) admitting negligence on the part of the insured, (3) relying
solely upon the validity of a doubtful release obtained from the injured
party, (4) failing to settle the case before trial, or (5) for an amount
less than the policy after judgment had been entered. A directed verdict
for defendant was reversed and a new trial granted.'
Provisions in liability insurance policies requiring the insurer to
defend all suits within the protection of the policy are common. Yet,
cases alleging a negligent defense of such suits are rarely litigated. The
scarcity of this litigation can undoubtedly be attributed to the fact that
counsel employed by the insurer are usually of equal, if not higher,
calibre than those who would be employed by the insured.
The decisions are uniform in holding that an indemnity insurer
who assumes the defense of a suit against the insured is liable in damages to the insured if such defense is conducted in a negligent manner.2
Good faith alone will not satisfy the insurer's duty.3 Itis said that this
duty is that of an agent to exercise reasonable care about his principal's
business.4 A comparable standard of care is imposed upon attorneys,
physicians, and other professional men. 5
Cases establishing liability on the part of the insurer may be classified
as follows:
I. For a negligent failure to settle claims.0 Suppose A has indemnity
'Ballard v. Ocean Accident and Guarantee Co., 86 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 7th,
1937).
2
Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident and Plate Glass Ins.

Co., 240 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917); Anderson v. Southern Surety Co., 107

Kan. 375, 191 Pac. 583, 21 A. L. R. 766 (1920): Aycock Hosiery Mills v. Maryland8 Casualty Co., 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S.W. (2d) 889 (1920).
Aycock Hosiery Mills v. Maryland Casualty Co., 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S. W.
(2d) 889 (1920).
'Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident and Plate Glass Ins.

Co., 240 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).

2 Cooley, Torts (3rd ed. 1906) 1387-1390.

oCavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident Fire and Life Assur. Corp., 79 N. H.

186, 106 Atl. 604 (1919); Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
81 N. H. 371, 127 Atl. 708 (1924).

